Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime

Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime
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Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith. On the other hand, some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement , have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligation. There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

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Cambridge Core - Public International Law - Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime - edited by Daniel H. Joyner. Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law edited by Daniel H Joyner and Marco Roscini.

The ICJ opinion notes that this obligation involves all NPT parties not just the nuclear weapon states and does not suggest a specific time frame for nuclear disarmament. Such failure, these critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals. Other observers have suggested that the linkage between proliferation and disarmament may also work the other way, i.

Some observers have even suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the superpowers—which has led to the elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems [19] —could eventually make the possession of nuclear weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal.

As one U. At the extreme, which it is precisely disarmament's hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge.

NPT Article IV acknowledges the right of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from international cooperation in this area, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. Article IV also encourages such cooperation.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA

The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the treaty.

As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market.

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Mohamed ElBaradei , then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency , has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the " Achilles' heel " of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As of 13 states have an enrichment capability.

Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major emphasis of U. Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons.

However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA with punitive sanctions enacted against it by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations, [26] and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual non-consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to report aspects of its enrichment program; [27] [28] and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December In , Romania reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former regime and the IAEA reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only.

In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed. In , Mohamed ElBaradei said that by some estimates thirty-five to forty states could have the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons.

Article I : [30] Each nuclear-weapons state NWS undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices. Article II : Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.

Article III : Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article IV : 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article VI : Each party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Article IX : "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January Article X : Establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice.

The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

It also establishes the duration of the Treaty 25 years before Extension Initiative. The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states.

It was recognized that the Cold War deterrent relationship between just the United States and the Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions, nuclear conflict. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in , it has been apparent that the development of nuclear capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and materials for weapons purposes.

Thus, the problem of preventing such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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They do this by reducing their own nuclear forces and through their bilateral cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation. However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA with punitive sanctions enacted against it by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations, [26] and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual non-consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to report aspects of its enrichment program; [27] [28] and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December Eisenhower in his " Atoms for Peace " proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, urged that an international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. Databases and Research Tools. Ready to take your reading offline?

Initial efforts, which began in , to create an international system enabling all States to have access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in without the achievement of this objective, due to serious political differences between the major Powers. By then, both the United States and the former Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their stockpiles. Eisenhower in his " Atoms for Peace " proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, urged that an international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries.

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His proposal resulted in in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , which was charged with the dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology. IAEA technical activities began in An interim safeguards system for small nuclear reactors, put in place in , was replaced in by a system covering larger installations and, over the following years, was expanded to include additional nuclear facilities.

Within the framework of the United Nations, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early as The NPT gained significant momentum in the early s. The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of international behaviour had become clear by the mids, and by final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, enable cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

It was opened for signature in , with Finland the first State to sign. Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of South African apartheid. In , China and France acceded to the NPT, the last of the five nuclear powers recognized by the treaty to do so. The treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force to decide whether the treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

Strengthening the Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Regime: Patricia Lewis

Accordingly, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May , state parties to the treaty agreed-without a vote-on the treaty's indefinite extension, and decided that review conferences should continue to be held every five years. Several NPT states parties have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs.

South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, but has since renounced it and acceded to the treaty in after destroying its small nuclear arsenal ; after this, the remaining African countries signed the treaty. The former Soviet Republics where nuclear weapons had been based, namely Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, transferred those weapons to Russia and joined the NPT by following the signature of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.

Successor states from the breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also joined the treaty soon after their independence. Montenegro and East Timor were the last countries to accede to the treaty on their independence in and ; the only other country to accede in the 21st century was Cuba in The tiny European states of Monaco and Andorra joined in Also acceding in the s were Myanmar in and Guyana in At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret nuclear weapons sharing agreements whereby the United States provided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and stored in, other NATO states.

Some argue this is an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the treaty. A counter-argument is that the U. They point out that the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practice handling and delivering the U.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NATO believes its "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political". Until that point of all-out war, however, the weapons themselves would remain in U. The point was to limit the spread of countries having their own nuclear weapons programs, helping ensure that NATO allies would not choose to go down the proliferation route. India and Pakistan have publicly disclosed their nuclear weapon programs, and Israel has a long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity with regards to its nuclear program see List of states with nuclear weapons.

India has detonated nuclear devices, first in and again in India argues that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before , but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.

India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in "If India did not sign the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it did not recognize the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment. In early March , India and the United States finalized an agreement, in the face of criticism in both countries, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them under IAEA safeguards.

The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Despite its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear cooperation with India was permitted on the basis of its clean non-proliferation record, and India's need for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a billion-plus population. Congress approved this agreement and President Bush signed it on 8 October When China announced expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in , proponents of arms control denounced both the deals, claiming that they weakened the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT.